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Keeping Civil Rights Actions Against State
Officials in Federal Court: Avoiding the Reach
of Parratt v. Taylor and Hudson v. Palmer
Stephen Shapiro*
I. Introduction
In the 1961 decision of Monroe v. Pape,1 the United States
Supreme Court revitalized 42 U.S.C. § 19832 by holding that indi-
viduals deprived of constitutional rights by state officers could sue
those officers directly in federal court.3 The Court specifically re-
jected the argument that if the defendants' actions subjected them
to state tort liability, a plaintiff would normally be relegated to
bringing a tort action in state court.4 The Court held that the
§ 1983 action was "supplementary"5 to any state tort action, and
that the plaintiff could bring the federal lawsuit regardless of
whether relief might be available under state law.6 Monroe led to
what has been termed an "explosion"7 or "flood"8 of § 1983 actions
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A.,
Haverford College (1971); J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School (1976).
1. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
2. This statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
3. 365 U.S. at 187.
4. Id. at 224-46 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
5. It is no answer that the state has a law which if enforced would give relief.
The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not
be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked. Hence the fact that
Illinois by its Constitution and laws outlaws unreasonable searches and seizures is
no barrier to the present suit in the federal court. Id. at 183.
6. This article focuses on § 1983 actions against state officials. The Court ex-
tended the Monroe v. Pape rationale to suits against federal officials in Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 390-91 (1971). Most of the arguments
contained herein should be applicable to Bivens actions.
7. Christina Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 5, 6 (1980).
8. Wayne McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial
Enforcement of Constitutional Protections, Part 1, 60 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1974).
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in federal courts.9 This statute has been of paramount importance
in enforcing rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.o
The Court seemed to retreat somewhat from this position in
the 1981 case of Parratt v. Taylor."z Taylor, an inmate of a Ne-
braska state prison, brought a § 1983 suit against prison officials
for negligently losing a hobby kit that had been mailed to him.
Taylor's theory of the case was that state officers had deprived
him of his property without affording him any sort of hearing,
thus violating his fourteenth amendment right to due process. The
Supreme Court agreed that in some cases the due process clause
obligated the state to provide a hearing before depriving an indi-
vidual of his property by state action.12 The Court noted, however,
that when it is impracticable for the state to provide a predepriva-
tion hearing, due process may be satisfied if the state provides a
postdeprivation remedy to compensate the individual. 13 It was im-
possible for the state to predict the "random and unauthorized" 14
negligent actions of its employees; therefore, the due process
clause obligated the state to provide only a postdeprivation proce-
9. The number of civil rights actions, excluding prisoner petitions, filed in the
federal courts increased from 296 in 1961 to 13,168 in 1979. State prisoners filed
11,195 civil rights petitions in 1979. Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, 1979 Annual Report of the Director 6, 61. Separate statistics are not kept
for § 1983 claims. These figures also include actions brought under other federal
civil rights statutes. The great majority of federal civil rights actions probably con-
tain a § 1983 claim.
10. "With all its procedural complexities, § 1983 has served as the procedural
vehicle which permitted the lower federal courts to implement the expansive vision
of the Bill of Rights enunciated by the Warren Court." Norman Dorsen, Paul
Bender, Burt Neuborne, Sylvia Law, 2 Political and Civil Rights in the United
States 499 (4th ed. 1979).
Section 1983 cases fall into two general categories: law reform cases and consti-
tutional torts. Law reform cases challenge and seek to change state laws and proce-
dures which violate the Constitution and laws of the United States. Many such
cases are brought by members of minorities and other oppressed groups challenging
unequal treatment under the equal protection clause, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1982) (alienage discrimination); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (race
discrimination); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (sex discrimination).
Constitutional tort claims seek monetary damages from public officials and
governmental bodies to redress harm caused to plaintiffs by unconstitutional gov-
ernmental action. The archetypical constitutional tort case is Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961) (damages for police officers' fourth amendment violations).
11. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
12. Id. at 537.
13. Id. at 538-39. The Court noted that earlier cases had recognized
that either the necessity of quick action by the State or the impracti-
cality of providing any meaningful predeprivation process, when cou-
pled with the availability of some meaningful means by which to
assess the propriety of the State's action at some time after the initial
taking, can satisfy the requirements of procedural due process.
Id. at 539.
14. Id. at 541.
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dure to redress the loss. Because the state had established a
postdeprivation tort claims procedure which could have compen-
sated him for his loss, it did not deprive Taylor of his property
without due process of law. Therefore, Taylor could not maintain
his § 1983 action.15
If the Court had limited the Parratt holding to its facts, a
negligent deprivation of property, Parratt would have had little ef-
fect on most civil rights litigation.16 In the recent case of Hudson
v. Palmer,17 however, the Court extended the Parratt rationale to
intentional deprivations of property.' 8 It appears possible, if not
probable, that the Court will further extend the holding to depri-
vations of life or liberty as well.19 The possibility of this extension
has prompted some commentators to note fearfully that "[i]f the
Parratt decision is followed to its logical extreme, it would under-
mine the basis for most § 1983 cases now brought in federal
court."20 Even if extended to intentional deprivations of life or lib-
erty, the Parratt rationale, if properly applied, should not affect
the great majority of § 1983 cases, leaving them in federal court as
required by Monroe.
15. Id. at 543-44.
16. In fact, the Parratt decision will open the door to some § 1983 actions based
on negligence, if a specific constitutional right has been violated. A secondary hold-
ing of Parratt is that § 1983 does not contain a state of mind requirement and that
negligent conduct may be actionable if the conduct deprived a person of rights se-
cured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Id. at 534-35.
17. 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984).
18. In Hudson, plaintiff claimed that prison guards had intentionally destroyed
his personal property during a shakedown search. The Supreme Court first held
that prisoners had no reasonable expectation of privacy entitling them to the pro-
tection of the fourth amendment. Id. at 3200-01. Then, as in Parratt, the Court
held that plaintiff's due process rights had not been violated because the state pro-
vided adequate postdeprivation remedies. Chief Justice Burger stated:
While Parratt is necessarily limited by its facts to negligent depriva-
tions of property, it is evident, as the Court of Appeals recognized, that
its reasoning applies as well to intentional deprivations of property.
The underlying rationale of Parratt is that when deprivations of prop-
erty are effected through random and unauthorized conduct of a state
employee, predeprivation procedures are simply "impracticable" since
the State cannot know when such deprivations will occur. We can dis-
cern no logical distinction between negligent and intentional depriva-
tions of property insofar as the "practicability" of affording
predeprivation process is concerned. The State can no more anticipate
and control in advance the random and unauthorized intentional con-
duct of its employees than it can anticipate similar negligent conduct.
Arguably, intentional acts are even more difficult to anticipate because
one bent on intentionally depriving a person of his property might
well take affirmative steps to avoid signalling his intent.
104 S. Ct. at 3203.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 64-73.
20. Leon Friedman, Parratt v. Taylor: Opening and Closing the Door on Section
1983, 9 Hast. Const. L.Q. 545, 546 (1982).
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Most § 1983 claims will survive because Parratt and Hudson
do not impose an across-the-board exhaustion requirement for
§ 1983 actions. The cases represent, rather, restriction on the un-
derlying right to procedural due process. They should have no af-
fect on § 1983 actions based on violations of other constitutional
provisions,2 1 including violations of protections afforded by the Bill
of Rights, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, and the substantive component of the due process clause.
They should not even affect the majority of procedural due process
claims, only those in which it was impossible for the state to pro-
vide a predeprivation hearing because the harm was inflicted by
the unanticipated actions of state officers.22
Fortunately, both the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts seem to be keeping the Parratt rationale within these limi-
tations.2 3 If the courts continue to observe these limitations, then
the great majority of § 1983 claims should be unaffected. Section
II of this article explains these limitations in more detail. By
keeping these limitations in mind, plaintiffs' attorneys should be
able to keep most § 1983 cases from preclusion by available state
remedies. This article provides suggestions for dealing with cases
in the grey area, where the reach of Parratt is unclear.
The greatest challenge facing plaintiffs' attorneys in this area
will come from cases involving excessive use of force, usually by
police. Where the use of excessive force is not the result of official
policy and not accompanied by a violation of a substantive consti-
tutional prohibition, it may be more difficult to avoid the reach of
Parratt and Hudson. Section III of this article advances argu-
ments which could help keep such claims from being relegated to
state assault and battery cases.
Finally, section IV offers tactical suggestions for dealing with
cases that seem to fall within the Parratt and Hudson holdings.
The important issues in these cases are whether the state remedy
is adequate to provide due process and in close cases whether
plaintiffs' attorneys should choose a federal or state court in the
first instance.
21. See infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
23. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (Parratt not applicable
to deprivation of property occurring pursuant to state procedures). See, e.g., Thibo-
deaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1984) (Parfatt applies only to asserted vio-
lations of procedural due process, not to substantive constitutional restrictions
applicable to the states) and other cases collected infra note 42.
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II. Exceptions to the Holding of Parratt v. Taylor
A. Challenging Established State Procedure
The Supreme Court indicated in Parratt that postdeprivation
remedies satisfied due process only when the deprivation was the
result of a random and unauthorized action by a state employee.24
The holding and reasoning of Parratt do not apply where the dep-
rivation was "a result of some established state procedure .. *"25
The Court clarified and reaffirmed this portion of the Parratt
opinion in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. 26 Zimmerman held
that an Illinois statute which prevented aggrieved persons from
pursuing employment discrimination claims violated the due pro-
cess clause. The Court distinguished Parratt on the ground that
the deprivation occurred pursuant to state procedures.27
Comparing the facts of Parratt with a slight variation illus-
trates the difference between losses caused by random, unauthor-
ized action and losses caused by established state procedure. In
Parratt, the Nebraska prison authorities had established proce-
dures designed to ensure the delivery of packages to inmates and
to minimize chances of loss. 28 The packages were lost because
prison employees negligently failed to follow the procedures. If,
however, Nebraska prison regulations had authorized prison em-
ployees to dispose summarily of packages addressed to inmates,
then any loss occasioned by employees acting pursuant to those
regulations would have constituted a due process violation under
Logan v. Zimmerman, regardless of state postdeprivation reme-
dies. The majority of important civil rights actions challenging
governmental activity challenge unconstitutional regulations and
procedures, rather than "random and unauthorized" actions by
public officers. 29 Therefore, Parratt, if correctly applied, should
24. 451 U.s. at 541.
25. Id.
26. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
27. In Parratt, the Court emphasized that it was dealing with "a tortious loss of
...property as a result of a random and unauthorized act by a state employee...
[n]ot a result of some established procedure." 451 U.S. at 541. Here, in contrast, it
is the state system itself that destroys a complainant's property interest, by opera-
tion of law, whenever the Commission fails to convene a timely conference-
whether the Commission's action is taken through negligence, maliciousness, or
otherwise. Parratt was not designed to reach such a situation. See iL at 545
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Unlike the complainant in Parratt, Logan is challeng-
ing not the Commission's error, but the "established state procedure" that destroys
his entitlement without according him proper procedural safeguards. 455 U.S. at
435-36.
28. 451 U.S. at 530.
29. This conclusion is based on several assumptions and value judgments about
what constitute important civil rights actions. First, actions challenging unconstitu-
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have little effect in this area.
There is, however, an unclear and troublesome middle
ground. What if the deprivation is not made "pursuant to" estab-
lished procedures, yet in some sense is "caused by" state proce-
dures? In Parratt, for example, Nebraska prison regulations
detailed a procedure which, if followed, would have protected
against the loss of property. If plaintiff had proved that prison em-
ployees were never adequately informed of or trained in the im-
plementation of these procedures, then any loss would not have
occurred "pursuant to" state procedures, but could have been
"caused by" state procedures (in this case, inadequate training pro-
cedures). Similarly, if the state had not established procedures for
dealing with inmate packages, any loss would not be "pursuant to"
state procedures, but could have been "caused by" the lack of
regulations.
The language of Parratt is not very helpful in determining
whether such situations would be covered by the holding, due to
Justice Rehnquist's various formulations describing Parratt's
reach. At some points he stated that a due process violation would
exist if the deprivation were "pursuant to"30 or "authorized by"3 1
established procedure, thus implying that the above examples
would not constitute due process violations. However, at another
point, he formulated the issue as whether the loss is "a result"32 of
some established procedure, and finally whether or not the loss is
"beyond the control of the State."3 3 Both of these phrases would
favor treating such cases as due process violations.
Despite Rehnquist's equivocations, the reasoning behind Par-
ratt clearly supports the argument that any loss caused by state
procedures is a deprivation without due process if it could have
tional policies and procedures benefit a much larger group of people than actions
challenging random and unauthorized actions. Second, those oppressed groups
most in need of federal court protection, e.g., minorities, women, the poor, etc., are
more likely to be oppressed by means of policies and regulations. Oppression
against such groups often tends to be institutionalized and hence fits under Logan v.
Zimmerman. Random and unauthorized actions by government officials have a
greater likelihood of harming members of the general public. This is especially
true of negligent violations. The Supreme Court cannot be faulted for its underly-
ing reason for the Parratt decision. Not every tort committed by a state official
should become the basis for a § 1983 due process federal lawsuit. 451 U.S. 544, cit-
ing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). If the harm inflicted upon a member of an
oppressed group is truly "random" (the harm was not directed at the plaintiff be-
cause of his or her status as a member of the oppressed group) then there may be
no great need for a federal, as opposed to a state remedy.
30. 451 U.S. at 537.
31. Id. at 538.




been anticipated that the procedures in question could have led to
a loss. The basic premise of Parratt is that because it is often im-
possible to anticipate random negligent losses by government per-
sonnel, the state cannot be expected to provide predeprivation
process. 34 In extending Parratt to intentional but unauthorized vi-
olations, the Court stated in Hudson: "The State can no more an-
ticipate and control in advance the random and unauthorized
intentional conduct of its employees than it can anticipate similar
negligent conduct."3 5 This statement would imply that when the
state can and should "anticipate and control in advance" the con-
duct of its employees and fails to do so, any loss as a result of such
conduct is a deprivation without due process. In his concurring
opinion in Parratt, Justice Blackmun wrote, "[w]hen it is possible
for a State to institute procedures to contain and direct the inten-
tional actions of its officials, it should be required, as a matter of
due process, to do so."'3 6
This line of reasoning is not unfamiliar to civil rights attor-
neys. Since the 1978 Supreme Court decision in Monell v. Depart-
ment of Social Services ,37 federal courts could hold municipalities
liable for constitutional violations committed by their employees.
However, municipal liability cannot be based on a respondeat supe-
rior theory. Rather, the governmental employer's own policy or
custom must be responsible for the injury before a municipality
may be held liable for constitutional violations committed by its
employees. 38 Therefore, civil rights attorneys have used theories
of inadequate training, supervision, or procedures to try to extend
damage liability from the municipal employee to the municipality
itself.3 9 Attorneys will have to make these same arguments after
Parratt in cases involving unauthorized deprivations by lower
34. Id.
35. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3203 (1984).
36. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 546 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
37. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
38. Id. at 694. Governmental responsibility may be based either on policy (prac-
tices formally approved through official decision-making channels) or custom (prac-
tices which although not authorized by written law are permanent and well
settled). Id. at 690-91. A governmental entity is responsible for its policy or custom
"whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said
to represent official policy .. " Id. at 694.
39. See, e.g., Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220, 1225 (8th Cir. 1981) (failure to
supervise overzealous police force); Murray v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 365, 367
(7th Cir. 1980), cert dismissed, 456 U.S. 604 (1981) (failure to establish or execute
procedures to avoid illegal arrests). Much of the case law in this area has been
clouded by a cryptic and apparently contradictory statement in Monell, citing Rizzo
v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976): "[T]he mere right to control without any control or
direction having been exercised and without any failure to supervise is not enough
to support § 1983 liability." 436 U.S. at 694 n.58.
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level government employees. Only now the stakes are higher.
Failure to show that the deprivation was caused by governmental
policy not only negates municipal liability, but may remove the
deprivation from the realm of procedural due process violations
entirely.
B. Violations of Specific Constitutional Rights
Another limitation on the scope of the Parratt doctrine is
that it applies only to violations of procedural due process. It is
not applicable to violations of other constitutional rights contained
in the Bill of Rights and made applicable to the states by virtue of
the fourteenth amendment. Justice Rehnquist clearly distin-
guished Parrat from cases such as Monroe v. Pape ,40 where plain-
tiff's fourth amendment rights had been violated. In such cases,
the Supreme Court held that plaintiff could maintain a § 1983 ac-
tion irrespective of any available state remedy:
The only deprivation respondent alleges in his complaint is
that "his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Con-
stitution of the United States were violated. That he was de-
prived of his property and Due Process of Law." App. 8. As
such, respondent's claims differ from the claims which were
before us in Monroe v. Pape, supra, which involved violations
of the Fourth Amendment, and the claims presented in Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), which involved alleged viola-
tions of the Eighth Amendment. Both of these Amendments
have been held applicable to the States by virtue of the adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mapp. v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
Respondent here refers to no other right, privilege, or immu-
nity secured by the Constitution or federal laws other than the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
simpliciter .41
Civil rights plaintiffs have not had trouble getting the federal
courts to recognize this distinction.42 It is important to keep this
distinction in mind when representing clients who have been de-
prived of life, liberty, or property by government employees. For
example, if the police have, without authorization, destroyed writ-
ten material belonging to a client, the client cannot bring a due
process claim in federal court because state court remedies would
provide adequate due process. However, if police destroy the ma-
40. 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (overruled on other grounds).
41. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 536 (1981).
42. See, e.g., Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1984) (eighth
amendment); Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 871-72 (7th Cir. 1983) (fourth
amendment); Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691, 704-05 (5th Cir. 1981), cert dis-
missed, 459 U.S. 1012 (right to vote).
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terial during an illegal search and seizure, the client should bring a
fourth amendment claim. If the police destroy the material to sup-
press ideas contained therein, the plaintiff should bring a first
amendment claim. If the material was a communication between a
prison inmate and his or her attorneys, the inmate should claim a
deprivation of the sixth amendment right to counsel.43 Fourteenth
amendment equal protection claims are also not subject to the Par-
ratt analysis.44 Therefore, a person more harshly treated because
of race, sex or other characteristics, even by the random and unau-
thorized action of a government employee,45 retains a federal
cause of action.
The challenge here for civil rights attorneys is to be innova-
tive in developing and expanding theories of substantive constitu-
tional violations. The fourth amendment, which heretofore has
been litigated more in a criminal than in a civil context,4 6 provides
a particularly promising opportunity for expansion. For example,
if police destroy a person's property during an illegal search, that
person can clearly maintain a § 1983 damage claim under the
fourth amendment. If, however, that person's property is illegally
seized by police and later lost or destroyed while in police custody,
it is unclear under present law whether the loss can be treated as a
fourth amendment violation.47 If plaintiffs' attorneys cannot de-
velop such a theory, then under Parratt and Hudson, plaintiffs
would be relegated to a state tort action.
III. Cases Involving Excessive Use of Force
Another area in which expanding the boundaries of the
43. Although the Supreme Court has indicated that a prison inmate "does not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy enabling him to invoke the protections of
the Fourth Amendment .... ," Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3202 (1984), the
Court has also held that certain deprivations of an inmate's life or liberty can con-
stitute violations of the eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1066
(1977). Chief Justice Burger intimated in Hudson that some deprivations of in-
mates' property rights could rise to the level of an eighth amendment violation. 104
S. Ct. at 3202.
44. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S. 496 (1982). The issue explic-
itly decided by the Court involved exhaustion of administrative remedies, but the
result (allowing the § 1983 equal protection claim to proceed without regard to
available state juridical or administrative remedies) clearly shows that Parratt does
not apply to equal protection claims.
45. The majority of equal protection cases are challenges to state policy or pro-
cedure and thus would also fit within the previously described exception to Parratt.
See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
46. This is due, of course, to the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
47. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3207 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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fourth amendment may be helpful is in providing a cause of action
for excessive or unjustified use of force by government employees,
especially police.48 After Parratt and Hudson, plaintiffs harmed
by police will have difficulty bringing a § 1983 claim against police
officers for excessive use of force when actions of the police are
not the result of established policy,49 not accompanied by viola-
tions of the Bill of Rights,50 and do not rise to the difficult "shock
the conscience" level required for a substantive due process viola-
tion.51 One theory mentioned but not relied on in a recent district
court case would make unreasonable use of force a fourth amend-
ment violation. "[The] Fourth Amendment right of people to be
secure in their 'persons' is a shield covering the individual's physi-
cal integrity and supports an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
reckless and wanton use of excessive force by police .. ."52
Another avenue which plaintiffs could pursue in excessive
force cases is the use of the substantive due process clause. The
holdings of Paratt and Hudson should not apply to substantive due
process violations, that is, "actions government officials may not
take no matter what procedural protections accompany them."53
48. In 1980 the United States Commission on Civil Rights found that
"[v]iolations of the Civil Rights of our people by some members of police depart-
ments is a serious national problem...." United States Commission on Civil Rights,
Police Practices and the Preservation of Civil Rights ii (1980). In 1976 the Supreme
Court, in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), severely limited the power of federal
courts to grant injunctive relief mandating police disciplinary procedures based on
the misconduct of individual police officers. See Note, Rethinking Federal Injunc-
tive Relief Against Police Abuse: Picking up the Pieces After Rizzo v. Goode, 7
Rut.-Cam. L.J. 530 (1976).
The Rizzo holding makes individual damage suits for police misconduct partic-
ularly important because of their deterrent effect. "Civil suits against individual
police officers may help to deter police misconduct." United States Commission on
Civil Rights, Who is Guarding the Guardians? A Report on Police Practices 164
(1981). For a compilation of numerous federal cases awarding damages for police
abuse, see Norman Dorsen, Paul Bender, Burt Neuborne, Sylvia Law, 2 Political
and Civil Rights in the United States 494-96 (4th ed. 1979).
49. See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
50. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
52. Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F. Supp. 605, 615 (D. Mass. 1982) (citing Jenkins v.
Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1231-32 (4th Cir. 1970)):
It should not be forgotten that the Fourth Amendment expressly de-
clares "the right of people to be secure in their persons * * * against
unreasonable searches and seizures." And "this inestimable right of
personal security belongs as much to the citizen on the streets of our
cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his secret
affairs." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1873, 20 L. Ed. 2d
889 (1968).
53. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3208 n.4 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring).
See also Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Parratt:
I also do not understand the Court to intimate that the sole content of
the Due Process Clause is procedural regularity. I continue to believe
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Federal courts, however, have had some difficulty determin-
ing exactly what governmental actions rise to the level of substan-
tive due process violations. The standard courts most often use is
whether the conduct "shocks the conscience" of the court. The
Supreme Court developed this formulation in the 1952 case of
Rochin v. California ,54 where police officers had pumped a sub-
ject's stomach against his will.55 The Court held that the stomach
pumping did "shock the conscience" and reversed Rochin's
conviction.5 6
The problem with such a "nebulous"5 standard is that re-
sults will vary greatly from case to case, depending on the sensitiv-
ity of the conscience of the individual judge. Although the
intentional use of force on a person already subdued and in cus-
tody would "shock the conscience" of many persons,5 8 most courts
require the infliction of serious injuries or an especially brutal at-
tack before finding a violation of substantive due process.5 9 Sev-
that there are certain governmental actions that, even if undertaken
with a full panoply of procedural protection, are, in and of themselves,
antithetical to fundamental notions of due process.
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. at 545 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
54. 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
Regard for the requirements of the Due Process Clause "inescapably
imposes upon this Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole
course of the proceedings [resulting in a conviction] in order to ascer-
tain whether they offend those canons of decency and fairness which
express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward
those charged with the most heinous offenses." Malinski v. New York,
supra, [324 U.S. 401] at 416-17 [1944]. These standards of justice are
not authoritatively formulated anywhere as though they were specif-
ics. Due process of law is a summarized constitutional guarantee of re-
spect for those personal immunities which, as Mr. Justice Cardozo
twice wrote for the Court, are "so rooted in the traditions and con-
science of our people as to be ranked as fundamental," Snyder v. Mas-
sachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, or are "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325.
Id. at 169.
55. Id. at 166.
56. Id. at 172, 174.
57. Barnier v. Szentmiklosi, 565 F. Supp. 869, 879 (E.D. Mich. 1983). Another
court has called it a "vague and discretionary standard." Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F.
Supp. 605, 616 (D. Mass. 1982).
58. See Michael Wells and Thomas Eaton, Substantive Due Process and the
Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 201 (1984). The authors argue that
any intentional tort committed by government officials should be considered a sub-
stantive due process violation. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984), see supra
note 18, however, would seem implicitly to reject such a broad theory.
59. Barnier v. Szentmildosi, 565 F. Supp. 869, 879 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (no substan-
tive due process violation where police pulled traffic offender "from his vehicle and
beat and choked him with their flashlights and hands"); Henderson v. Counts, 544
F. Supp. 149 (E.D. Va. 1982) (plaintiff must submit affidavit showing "severity of
the injuries inflicted" even where inflicted "maliciously and without provocation").
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eral recent opinions have focused on an explanation by Judge
Friendly:
Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unneces-
sary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates a prisoner's
constitutional rights. In determining whether the constitu-
tional line has been crossed, a court must look to such factors
as the need for the application of force, the relationship be-
tween the need and the amount of force that was used, the ex-
tent of injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a
good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or mali-
ciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.60
Although Friendly's formulation has also been criticized because it
"does not instruct the factfinder as to how much weight should be
given to each factor," 61 it is certainly more helpful than the "shock
the conscience" standard.
Another argument which plaintiffs might consider in cases
involving intentional use of excessive force is that Parratt is not
applicable to cases involving intentional deprivations of life or lib-
erty. This argument had a better chance of acceptance before the
-recent Supreme Court decision in Hudson v. Palmer.62 By ex-
tending Parratt to intentional deprivations of property, the Court
made it much more difficult to distinguish deprivations of life or
liberty because the reasoning behind Parratt is not dependent
upon the type of deprivation.
Before the decision in Hudson v. Palmer, federal courts had
split on the issues of whether to extend Parratt to cases involving
intentional deprivations63 and to cases involving deprivations of
life and liberty .64 Those courts which refused to extend Parratt
60. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1033 (1973), cited in Henderson v. Counts, 544 F. Supp. 149, 153 (E.D. Va. 1982) and
Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F. Supp. 605, 616 (D. Mass. 1982).
61. Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F. Supp. 605, 616 (D. Mass. 1982).
62. 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984). See supra note 18.
63. Four circuits held that Parratt extended to intentional deprivations of prop-
erty. Palmer v. Hudson, 697 F.2d 1220 (4th Cir. 1983), affd in part, rev'd in part,
104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984); Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1983); Engblom
v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982); Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d
1345 (9th Cir. 1981), affd sub nov., Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (1983). Three
circuits held that it did not. Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1982);
Weiss v. Lehman, 676 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1103 (1983);
Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1981).
64. For cases holding Parratt not applicable to deprivations of life or liberty,
see Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1982); Wakinekona v. Olim, 664 F.2d
708 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 461 U.S. 238 (1983); Howse v. DeBerry
Correctional Inst., 537 F. Supp. 1177 (M.D. Tenn. 1982); Tarkowski v. Hoogasian,
532 F. Supp. 791 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
For cases extending Parratt to deprivations of life or liberty, see Haygood v.
Younger, 718 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1983), rehg en banc granted, 729 F.2d 613 (1984);
Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1983); Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510
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did not rely on Justice Rehnquist's reasoning in the opinion. They
seemed to assume that Parratt established a special rule for cases
involving negligent deprivations of property. One district court
stated, "[t]his Court does not believe that the Supreme Court in-
tended the rationale of Parratt to extend beyond the facts basi-
cally similar to those in that case-that is, where only a negligent
deprivation of property is involved."6 5 Those courts refusing to ex-
tend Parratt also relied on the concurring opinion of Justice
Blackmun 66 which made it clear that he joined the Court's opinion
only with the understanding that the decision did not apply to dep-
rivations of life or liberty or to intentional deprivations of
property.67
Those courts which extended Parratt to intentional depriva-
tions of property or to deprivations of life or liberty concentrated
on the reasoning of Rehnquist's opinion, rather than the specific
facts in Parratt. One court stated, "there is no logical reason to
distinguish 'property' and 'liberty' for purposes of determining
whether the state has provided due process ....
All courts which have addressed the question since the deci-
sion in Hudson v. Palmer have decided to extend the Parratt hold-
ing to deprivations of life and liberty.6 9 Why Hudson, which
extended Parratt to intentional deprivations of property, provides
a basis for extending Parratt to deprivations of life and liberty,
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1969 (1982); Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792 (4th
Cir. 1983); Juncker v. Tinney, 549 F. Supp. 574 (D. Md. 1982); Eberle v. Baumfalk,
524 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
65. Howse v. DeBerry Correctional Inst., 537 F. Supp. 1177, 1178 (M.D. Tenn.
1982) (emphasis in original).
66. Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387, 394-95 (5th Cir. 1982) citing 451 U.S. at
545-46 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Howse v. DeBerry Correctional Inst., 537 F.
Supp. 1177, 1178-79 (M.D. Tenn. 1982); Tarkowski v. Hoogasian, 532 F. Supp. 791,
794 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
67.1 do not read the Court's opinion as applicable to a case concerning
deprivation of life or of liberty....
Most importantly, I do not understand the Court to suggest that
the provision of "postdeprivation remedies" . . . would cure the un-
constitutional nature of a state official's intentional act that deprives a
person of property.
451 U.S. at 545-46 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
68. Barnier v. Szentmiklosi, 565 F. Supp. 869, 877 (E.D. Mich. 1983). The court
also held that distinguishing property and liberty "would be contrary to Ingraham
v. Wright." Id. at 878. In Ingraham, a pre-Parratt case, the Supreme Court held
that common law tort remedies provided due process to students whose liberty in-
terests might be violated by unreasonable infliction of corporal punishment. 430
U.S. 651 (1977).
69. See Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1984); Augustine v. Doe,
740 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1984); Dobson v. Green, 596 F. Supp. 122 (E.D. Pa. 1984);
Cerva v. Fulma, 596 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
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was most cogently stated in Thibodeaux v. Bordelon :70
Much of the lack of uniformity in interpretation of Parratt
stems from a tendency to view Parratt as a special rule
designed to insulate negligent state actors from lawsuits in fed-
eral court. But Hudson demonstrates that Parratt is not an
isolated rule but rather part of a consistent body of procedural
due process doctrine. Viewed in the context of this doctrine,
Parratt lends itself to principled application....
The central question in determining the applicability of
Parratt, therefore, is whether it is practicable for the state to
provide a predeprivation hearing: "The controlling inquiry is
solely whether the State is in a position to provide for
predeprivation process. . . ." Just as there is no reason to dis-
tinguish intentional from negligent deprivations, there is no
reason to differentiate between liberty and and property
interests.71
The Thibodeaux court also noted that the Hudson opinon
was unanimous in regard to extending Parratt. Justices Blackmun
and White, who had objected to applying the Parratt holding to in-
tentional deprivations of property or to deprivations of life or lib-
erty, both joined the Court's opinion in Hudson extending Parratt
to intentional deprivations of property. In his Parratt concur-
rence, Justice Blackmun actually gave a reason for distinguishing
negligent from intentional deprivations, 72 whereas he provided no
reasons for distinguishing deprivations of property from depriva-
tions of life and liberty. Therefore, the fact that he and Justice
White have given up their objections to the extension from negli-
gent to intentional violations provides a fairly good indication that
they are also willing to extend the holding to deprivations of life
or liberty.73
70. 740 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1984).
71. Id. at 335-37, citing Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. at 3204.
72.While the "random and unauthorized" nature of negligent acts by
state employees makes it difficult for the State to "provide a meaning-
ful hearing before the deprivation takes place," . . . it is rare that the
same can be said of intentional acts by state employees. When it is
possible for a State to institute procedures to contain and direct the in-
tentional actions of its officials, it should be required, as a matter of
due process, to do so.
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. at 546 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In Hudson, the
Court, in an opinion joined by Justice Blackmun, specifically rejected this
argument:
The State can no more anticipate and control in advance the random
and unauthorized intentional conduct of its employees than it can an-
ticipate similar negligent conduct. Arguably, intentional acts are even
more difficult to anticipate because one bent on intentionally depriv-
ing a person of his property might well take affirmative steps to avoid
signalling his intent.
104 S. Ct. at 3203.
73. Another argument, rejected by at least one court, distinguished liberty in-
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Any attorney arguing that Parratt should not be extended to
intentional deprivations of life or liberty will have to focus on the
reasons which prompted the Parratt decision rather than the rea-
soning of the opinion itself. The impetus behind the Parratt deci-
sion was to avoid making the fourteenth amendment a "font of
tort law," "turning every alleged injury inflicted by a state official
acting under 'color of law' into a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. . .. "74 The Court was concerned that "any party
who is involved in nothing more than an automobile accident with
a state official could allege a constitutional violation under
§ 1983." 7 5 The Court correctly determined that the drafters of the
fourteenth amendment never intended it "to play such a role in
our society."76 The drafters did intend, however, that the amend-
ment would prohibit a law enforcement official from intentionally
beating a citizen; and the drafters of § 1983 did intend to provide a
federal cause of action for such a violation.
IV. Considerations When Parratt Appears to be Applicable
A. Is the State Remedy Adequate to Provide Due Process?
When confronted by a case which Parratt appears to relegate
to state law, an attorney should examine the available state
postdeprivation remedies to determine whether they provide due
process. Parratt did not retreat from earlier cases that "mandate
that some kind of hearing is required at some time before a State
finally deprives a person of his property interests."7z This hearing
must occur "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."7 8
Parratt merely made clear that in cases involving random and un-
authorized deprivations by state officials, the meaningful time re-
quirement is satisfied by a postdeprivation hearing. This
postdeprivation hearing must still satisfy the meaningful manner
terests because "a postdeprivation damages remedy can never fully compensate for
a loss of liberty." Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329, 338 (5th Cir. 1984). The
court noted that "[h]istorically damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy
for an invasion of personal interests in liberty." Id. (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971)).
In any case, "[i]f the loss is 'incompensable,' this is as much so under
§ 1983 as it would be under any other remedy," Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at
3204; postdeprivation damages awarded under section 1983 will be no
more or less adequate than damages awarded under state law.
740 F.2d at 338.
74. 451 U.S. at 544.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 540.
78. Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
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requirement. The Court has not fully answered the question of
what constitutes a meaningful manner for such a hearing.
Parratt did make clear that the state need not provide a
plaintiff "all the relief which may have been available if he could
have proceeded under § 1983."79 The Nebraska state tort remedy
was determined to be adequate even though "it provides only for
an action against the State as opposed to its individual employees,
it contains no provisions for punitive damages, and there is no
right to a trial by jury."s0 In fact, although the Nebraska remedy
was a tort procedure, administrative remedies will, in some cases,
be considered adequate.8 ' The standard established by Parratt is
whether "[t]he remedies provided could have fully compensated
the respondent for the property loss he suffered. ... 82
In spite of the Court's recognition in Parratt that the state
remedies "could have fully compensated" the plaintiff,83 it is un-
likely that the Court will always require the possibility of full
compensation before it will consider the state remedies adequate
to provide due process. Even a federal § 1983 action does not as-
sure full compensation for a plaintiff who proves he was harmed
by unconstitutional action, because various personal and govern-
mental immunities bar damage relief in some cases.8 4 Because the
Parratt Court was willing to accept a state procedure which pro-
vided less relief than a § 1983 action, it is unlikely that the Court
will require a state remedy to provide compensation in a situation
where relief would be barred in a federal suit.
In determining whether a state remedy is adequate to dis-
place a § 1983 action, the problem facing the courts will be to de-
termine to what extent a state may provide immunities from
damage liability for itself and its officials. It would make a mock-
ery of the Parratt decision to require the state to provide a
postdeprivation hearing, and then allow it to immunize itself and
79. Id. at 544.
80. Id. at 543-44.
81. See, e.g., Dusanek v. Hannon, 677 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1982). cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1017 (1982). For a fuller discussion of the issue, see Rodney Smolla, The Dis-
placement of Federal Due Process Claims by State Tort Remedies: Parratt v. Taylor
and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company, U. Ill. L. Rev. 831, 883-86 (1982).
82. 451 U.S. at 544.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (absolute immunity from dam-
ages for judges, good-faith immunity for police officers); Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232 (1974) (good-faith immunity for state executive officials); Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, rehg denied, 416 U.S. 1000 (1974) (sovereign immunity for retroactive
monetary awards from the state treasury). But see Owen v. City of Independence,




its officials completely from damages. In Hudson v. Palmer,
before affirming the lower court's dismissal of plaintiff's due pro-
cess claim, the Supreme Court determined that his state court
damage action would not be barred by sovereign immunity.8 5
It is hard to imagine, however, that the Supreme Court in-
tends to require the states to abolish all forms of personal damage
immunity which they presently grant to government officials, for
it has deemed at least some of these common law immunities im-
portant enough to survive as defenses to § 1983 claims.86 It also
seems unlikely that courts will force other governmental bodies to
accept damage liability for their employees on a respondeat supe-
rior basis, for this, too, has been rejected in § 1983 cases.8 7 It
seems reasonable, therefore, that the courts will deem a state rem-
edy adequate to displace a § 1983 action, as long as the plaintiff's
chances of being fully compensated are not significantly less under
state law than under federal law. Yet if governmental bodies re-
tain in their own systems exactly the same immunities for them-
selves and their employees as they now enjoy under § 1983, some
cases of negligent deprivations and even some intentional depriva-
tions will remain uncompensated in both federal and state court.
Fortunately, there has been a recent trend, both legislative and ju-
dicial, toward restricting sovereign immunity in the state sys-
tems,8 8 and even if Parratt may not require such restrictions, it
may encourage them. In any case, an attorney's best chance of
challenging a state remedy as inadequate will occur when state im-
munities are significantly broader than those available in a § 1983
action.8 9
B. Choosing Between the Federal and State Remedy
Before bringing any suit which the Parratt doctrine might
85. 104 S. Ct. at 3204-05.
86. See supra note 84. See Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792 (4th Cir. 1983), a
post-Hudson case which held that the "possibility of a sovereign immunity defense"
being asserted by a state official did not make the state tort remedy inadequate. Id.
at 798. The court noted that even in a § 1983 action, plaintiff might have been
barred by defendant's assertion of a good-faith immunity from damages. Id.
87. Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
88. See Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 1044-46 (5th ed. 1984). Two
recent examples of state court cases expanding liability, under state tort principles,
for negligent infliction of harm by government officials are Irwin v. Town of Ware,
392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984) (municipality may be held liable for negligent
failure to remove intoxicated driver from highway) and Schear v. BL of County
Commissioners, No. 15,324 (N.M. Sup. Ct. Aug. 6, 1984) (law enforcement officers
may be held liable for negligent failure to respond to crime victim's emergency
call).
89. See Smolla, supra note 81, at 871-81 for a fuller discussion of this issue.
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cover, plaintiff's attorney must decide whether to bring a federal
§ 1983 action or to proceed with state remedies in a state forum. A
wrong decision in either direction could prove harmful to the
plaintiff. In a case to which Parratt is clearly applicable, plaintiff's
attorney will have no choice but to bring the action in state rather
than federal court. If the attorney files the federal action and the
district court holds Parratt applicable, it will dismiss the § 1983 ac-
tion, relegating plaintiff to the state remedy. At the very least,
this dismissal will cause the extra expense and delay of beginning
a new lawsuit. If the dismissal occurs after the state statute of lim-
itations has run, plaintiff may lose the right of action entirely.
If, however, Parratt clearly does not apply (because the ac-
tion challenges established state procedure or involves violations
of constitutional rights other than due process) it should be rea-
sonably safe to bring a federal § 1983 action. An attorney who er-
roneously assumes that Parratt will apply may needlessly cost his
client the normally more desirable federal forum.9° Thus, she will
lose any advantages that federal substantive law has over state
substantive law, for state tort law rather than federal civil rights
law will apply to such issues as liability, amount of damages, im-
munities, etc.
What should a plaintiff's attorney do, however, in a case in
which it is unclear whether Parratt applies? In such a case, plain-
tiff's attorney must carefully weigh the advantages of a federal
over a state action against the danger of losing the claim entirely,
or at the very least, having to start over again in state court.
There are several approaches that plaintiffs might take to try
to establish a § 1983 claim without losing the alternative state
claim if Parratt is held applicable. Unfortunately, none of them
are particularly attractive. First, plaintiff could bring a § 1983 suit
in federal court, bringing alternative state claims along under pen-
dent jurisdiction. 91 If Parratt is not held applicable until trial,
plaintiff may be able to recover under her state claims even
though the federal claim is dismissed.92 If, however, Parratt is
90. Civil rights attorneys normally consider a federal forum more desirable be-
cause they consider federal judges 1) more technically competent to handle federal
questions, 2) more insulated from majoritarian pressures by their life tenure, and 3)
as representatives of the federal government more likely to enforce federal rights
vigorously at the expense of state interests. Bart Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90
Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1977).
91. Under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, federal courts have constitu-
tional power to hear state claims which "derive from a common nucleus of opera-
tive fact" along with federal claims properly within their jurisdiction. United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
92. Pursuant to Gibbs, it is within the discretionary power of the district court
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held applicable and the federal claim dismissed before trial (pursu-
ant to a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment),
then the judge will probably dismiss the state claims as well.93
A second alternative would be for plaintiff to file simultane-
ously a § 1983 suit in federal court and a state law claim in state
court. The fact that plaintiff has actually filed a state action, how-
ever, may influence the federal court to hold Parratt applicable
and dismiss the federal claim.94 Claim preclusion, one aspect of
the doctrine of res judicata, may also present a problem for this
approach.9 5 The Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of
claim preclusion may prohibit a plaintiff from bringing a federal
lawsuit after a state court decides a lawsuit in which the plaintiff
could have brought the federal claim.96 Therefore, if the state suit
reaches judgment first, plaintiff may be barred from continuing
her federal action.
The third alternative would be to bring both the § 1983 claim
and the state law claim in state court.9 7 This is the least risky al-
ternative. If the state judge holds Parratt applicable and dismisses
to proceed to try only the pendent state claim, if it dismisses the underlying federal
claim at trial. 383 U.S. at 727-29. A major factor in the court's decision to allow the
state claim to proceed is whether plaintiff was aware of the relative importance of
the state, versus the federal claim.
For example, it may appear that the plaintiff was well aware of the
nature of his proofs and the relative importance of his claims; recogni-
tion of a federal court's wide latitude to decide ancillary questions on
state law does not imply that it must tolerate a litigant's effort to im-
pose upon it what is in effect only a state law case.
Id. at 727. For an example of a case which allowed the state law claim to proceed
after dismissal at trial of the § 1983 claim based on Parratt, see Barnier v.
Szentmiklosi, 565 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Mich. 1983): "In view of the time and energy
expended by the court and the parties before the federal claim was dismissed, the
court properly exercised its authority and discretion to try the state law claims by
themselves." Id. at 871 n.1.
93. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966): "Certainly, if
the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a ju-
risdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well."
94. Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir. 1981), affd
sub nom., Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (1983).
95. Res judicata is a generic term which encompasses both issue preclusion (col-
lateral estoppel) and claim preclusion. Claim preclusion, the modem term which
encompasses the traditional doctrines of merger and bar, operates to prevent a
court from hearing a claim which was or should have been brought in an earlier
lawsuit. See generally Allan Vestal, Rationale of Preclusion, 9 St. Louis U.L.J. 29
(1964); Restatement (Second) of Judgments, introductory note to § 24 (1982).
96. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 104 S. Ct. 892 (1984).
Although in Migra the plaintiff brought state and federal cases sequentially, rather
than simultaneously, the Court's reasoning, which was based on the federal full
faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982), would seem to apply any time the
state case reaches judgment first.
97. The Supreme Court has held that state courts may decide § 1983 claims.
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7, reh'g denied, 445 U.S. 920 (1980).
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the § 1983 claim, plaintiff may still pursue the state law claim. In
close cases, however, a state judge is probably more likely to hold
Parratt applicable than a federal judge. Also, even if the state
judge does not apply Parratt and allows the § 1983 claim to pro-
ceed, plaintiff will gain only the benefit of federal law, not a fed-
eral forum.
V. Conclusion
Parratt v. Taylor was an attempt by the Supreme Court to
prevent negligent torts from becoming the basis for federal civil
rights actions merely because they were committed by state offi-
cials. The Court held that negligent deprivations of property by
state officers do not violate procedural due process unless the state
does not provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy to compen-
sate the victim for the loss. The Court recently extended the Par-
ratt holding to intentional deprivations of property in Hudson v.
Palmer. It appears that the courts will further extend the doc-
trine to encompass negligent or intentional deprivations of life or
liberty. This doctrine, if misapplied, could force an enormous
number of cases involving constitutional violations by state offi-
cials into state courts as tort cases, rather than allowing them to
proceed as federal civil rights actions.
In order to keep the federal courts from relegating many de-
serving § 1983 cases to state tort cases through the Parratt doc-
trine, attorneys must be cognizant of several restrictions on this
doctrine. Although after Hudson, Parratt applies to both negli-
gent and intentional deprivations, it applies only to random and
unauthorized actions by state employees. In such cases, because
the state could not anticipate or prevent the deprivation before-
hand, a state postdeprivation remedy will satisfy due process. If,
however, the deprivation occurred pursuant to established state
procedures, then the Parratt doctrine does not apply and the case
may proceed in federal court.
Parratt also applies only to violations of procedural due pro-
cess, not to violations of the Bill of Rights, the equal protection
clause, or the substantive component of the due process clause.
Plaintiffs may still redress violations of these other constitutional
rights in a § 1983 action regardless of whether the state also pro-
vides a remedy.
The most difficult situations for both plaintiffs' attorneys and
federal judges to deal with will be cases involving excessive use of
force by law enforcement officials. Excessive use of force is usu-
ally not authorized by state rules and regulations, and would
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therefore seem to fit within the Parratt doctrine. If plaintiff can
show, however, that the individual officer's actions were the result
of inadequate training or screening, then the court might hold that
government policy caused the harm, thereby taking the actions
outside the reach of the Parratt doctrine. Another way for plain-
tiffs' attorneys to handle excessive force cases is to claim a viola-
tion of substantive due process or of the fourth amendment. If the
plaintiff can show that the officer's actions were so abusive as to
violate substantive due process or interefered with plaintiff's phys-
ical integrity in a manner that constituted an unreasonable
seizure, then Parratt should not apply. It is possible, however,
that the Parratt doctrine, as extended by Hudson, may relegate at
least some cases of excessive use of force to state assault and bat-
tery cases.
Even in those cases in which a state postdeprivation remedy
will satisfy due process, the remedy must be "adequate" in order to
displace the federal action. The Supreme Court has not fully de-
fined all the requirements of an adequate state remedy. It must
allow plaintiff to have claims heard in a meaningful manner, but
need not provide all the relief to which plaintiff would have been
entitled in a § 1983 lawsuit.
If attorneys keep these limitations on the Parratt doctrine in
mind, Parratt should not affect the great majority of civil rights
cases which they bring to redress constitutional violations commit-
ted by state officers.
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